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Abstract
In many countries, the electricity systems are quitting the vertically integrated monopoly
organization for an operation framed by competitive markets. It therefore questions how flexi-
ble nuclear plants capable of load-following should be operated in an open market framework.
A number of technico-economical features of the operation of flexible nuclear plants drive our
modelling complex which makes difficult to determine the optimal management of the nuclear
production within our model. In order to examine the existence of an equilibrium and calculate
it, we focus on a short-term (monthly) management horizon of the fuel of nuclear reactors. The
marginal cost of nuclear production being (significantly) lower than that of thermal production
induces a discontinuity of producer’s short-term profit. The problem of discontinuity makes the
resolution of the optimal short-term production problem extremely complicated and even leads
to a lack of solutions. That is why it is necessary to study an approximate problem (continuous
problem) that constitutes a “regularization” of our economical problem (discontinuous prob-
lem). Its resolution provides us with an equilibrium which proves the existence of an optimal
production trajectory.
Key words: Electricity market, nuclear generation, competition with reservoir, optimal
short-term production problem, price discontinuity, quadratic programming.
JEL code numbers: C61, C63, D24, D41, L11.
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21 Introduction
Nuclear generation differentiates itself from other technologies by its important fixed cost and
low variable cost (Bertel and Naudet (2004), DGEMP & DIDEME (2003, 2008), MIT (2003,
2009), Cour des Comptes (2012)). This is the main reason why nuclear is deemed to serve
the baseload demand. The nuclear plants being operated as baseload plants, produce energy
at a constant rate using their full capacity in order to cover their fixed costs. From a market
perspective, nuclear is “economically suitable” to operate at baseload because of its relatively
low variable costs, which imply a low marginal cost. Nevertheless, an important participation
of nuclear in the generation of a country can lead to a different operation. A typical example
of this is France which is distinct from other countries (like UK or Sweden) because nuclear
generation accounts for 80% of generation and 53% of installed generating capacity. The high
share of nuclear in the national mix asks nuclear plants to be flexible2 operating occasionally at
semi-base load that corresponds to less than 5000 hours of operation per year and responds to
a part of the variable demand (Regulatory Commission of Energy (2007), Pouret and Nuttall
(2007), Bruynooghe et al. (2010)). That type of relative importance of the nuclear production
vis-a`-vis other generation technologies is an exception and the literature on this subject is
extremely reduced.
However, in numerous countries, electricity systems are quitting the vertically integrated
monopoly organization for an operation framed by competitive markets (e.g. European Union).
This reopens -both empirically and theoretically- the question of nuclear operation. Economic
reasoning supports that in a changing environment, the choice and operation of generation
may also change. In the previously monopolistic and vertically integrated markets, the optimal
management of this production technology was mainly a technical issue, as there was a guaran-
tee of selling the whole nuclear production, adjustments of production levels could be done by
other even more flexible technologies (e.g. hydro, gas). In a competitive setting, this question
is not only of a technological nature (Chevalier (2004)). Given the differences in production
costs of different technologies and the variations in market prices, the maximization of the
economic value of nuclear production becomes a crucial issue for producers. Consequently, a
question arises: what could be the optimal management of a flexible nuclear set in a competi-
tive setting? Within this competitive framework, we address the medium-term horizon (1 to 3
years) of management to take into account the fluctuations of demand according to the seasons
of a year. In the medium-term, the managers of a large nuclear set (like the French) have to
set their seasonal variation of output in order to satisfy the seasonal demand. We emphasize
two stylized seasons: a season of high demand and a season of low demand. In continental
Europe, it corresponds respectively to winter and summer. In this medium-term horizon, a
core feature of market based nuclear is that the nuclear fuel works as a “reservoir” of energy
- partly similar to a water reservoir of hydro energy. This feature of nuclear is based on the
discontinuous reloading of nuclear reactors. Nuclear units stop only periodically (from 12 to
18 months) to reload their fuel. Then a new period of production (“campaign” of production)
starts. A producer allocates a limited and exhaustible amount of nuclear fuel between winter
and summer to respond to demand’s variations and to maximize its profit. Therefore, we will
look at this question as a rational economic analysis of the operation of a nuclear fuel “reser-
voir”. While such an analytical frame obviously makes sense from a theoretical point of view,
it is both highly unconventional and entirely unexplored in the public literature. This is mainly
2The european pressurized reactor (EPR), which is an evolution of the pressurized water reactor (PWR),
is an example of a III+ generation nuclear reactor which is designed to accommodate load-following operation
(AREVA (2005), Goldberg and Rosner (2012)).
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3due to the existence of a number of difficulties that one faces on a theoretical plan in order to
build a model of optimal management of flexible nuclear plants in a competitive market.
There exist difficulties that result from the relatively high technological complexity that
characterizes nuclear as an electricity generation technology. This technological complexity can
be seen through the potentially higher investment and exploitation costs than those identified
for other energy sources using conventional techniques (e.g. fossil fuel generation technologies).
Several technico-economical constraints have to be considered when a nuclear producer searches
for an equilibrium of the problem of optimal allocation of the nuclear fuel stock during a
campaign of production. These constraints have to do mostly with the flexible operation of
nuclear plants (minimum/maximum production constraints) and the operation of the nuclear
fuel reservoir which is based on the mode of fuel reloading of nuclear reactors (nuclear fuel
constraints).
Another difficult aspect of our problem concerns the implication of competition in the optimal
management of a flexible nuclear set. The question of optimal operation of such a nuclear set
has not been raised so far for a competitive market given that France has not fully opened
till now its electricity market to competition like other countries e.g. UK. Indeed, the French
historical operator (EDF) holds the total capacity of the nuclear set which offers the majority
of the total electricity generation, and thus has a dominant position in its historical national
electricity market. Therefore, the creation of a benchmark of optimal operation in a competitive
framework has not been done yet. We build a microeconomic deterministic dynamic model
of optimal management of flexible nuclear plants by taking into account the feature of the
reservoir in a market where producers disposing a certain amount of nuclear capacity compete
with each other to maximize their profits and at the same time to even meet energy demand.
This benchmark could give some insight with respect to the optimal production behaviour of
nuclear producers in a market based electricity system.
The constraints imposed by the equality between supply and demand (called supply-demand
equilibrium constraints) play a decisive role in the determination of the optimal management of
flexible market based nuclear. In view of the large proportion of nuclear in the electricity system,
the global balance between supply and demand depends mainly on the nuclear production. This
makes the nuclear set responsible to a large extent for ensuring this balance and preventing
potential disruptions of supply which could lead to a “blackout”. As a consequence, each nuclear
producer has to take account of constraints intrinsic to the public interest and social welfare
such that of the equality between supply and demand. Consequently, in the medium-term
horizon, the nuclear fuel reservoir has to be managed so that imbalances between production
and consumption are avoided during a campaign of production.
We study the optimal management of the fuel reservoir of a flexible nuclear unit given the
decentralization of the nuclear generation. We assume the existence of two flexible types of
generation: nuclear and thermal (e.g. coal, gas, etc.). In view of the complexity of our model,
the producers starting with the optimization of their nuclear production do not immediately
know how to manage all the factors affecting the market equilibrium in the medium-term
(all over a fuel campaign) within our model. For this reason, they reduce their management
horizon to that portion of the market being easier to foresee: the monthly horizon3. Each
generation units manager playing on a market base aims at the determination of a production
profile that: (i) respects the constraints imposed by the flexible operation of a nuclear unit
(e.g. load-following operation of an EPR) and the thermal generation capacity for each month
(minimum/maximum production constraints), (ii) respects the constraints imposed by the
inter-temporal management of the nuclear fuel stock over the entire time horizon of production
3This will be called short-term management of the production (during the medium-term horizon).
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4(nuclear fuel constraints), (iii) respects the constraints induced by the overall equality between
supply and demand (i.e. total supply equals total demand) at every moment over each month,
(iv) maximizes the value of profit for each month.
The interest of a short-term horizon of management of the nuclear fuel reservoir is to set up
a model that will take into account several complex technico-economical characteristics of the
operation of flexible nuclear units in a competitive framework and then to examine the existence
of a production path that verifies the above conditions ((i), (ii), (iii), (iv)) and determine it
within this model. This will serve as a reference for the existence of an equilibrium before the
producers proceed with a more complex problem based on a multi-annual optimization implying
an augmentation of their management horizon to one or more campaigns of production (“non-
myopic” case). It will also permit to analyze the outcome of such approach consisting of
a partially “myopic” (short-sighted) optimization of the nuclear production and identify its
limits before the producers turn their interest into the “non-myopic” case.
In section 2, we build a general deterministic dynamic model to study the optimal short-
term operation of flexible nuclear plants in a perfect competitive setting. In section 3, we study
the optimal short-term production behaviour. We introduce the notion of the merit order
equilibrium in the case of N > 2 producers. Then, we present different approaches to calculate
a merit order equilibrium. Finally, in section 4, we collect some basic data to feed our model.
In order to get a complete data set suitable for the numerical modelling, we proceed with an
interpolation of the missing data. Then, we analyze the production and nuclear fuel decisions
of our last approach within a simple numerical model. The section 6 concludes.
2 Model: Perfect competitive case
In this section, we describe our general deterministic dynamic model of a perfectly competitive
electricity market where there exist two types of generation: nuclear and thermal. Nuclear is
a complex generation technology given its technical and economical characteristics. Therefore,
we deal with a demanding modelling with respect to nuclear technology in order to be realistic
and at the same time we make assumptions which permit to our model to be manageable.
In our model, the price in the electricity market is determined by the merit order price rule
which implies perfect competition according to which firms treat price as a parameter and not
as a choice variable. Price taking firms guarantee that when firms maximize their profits (by
choosing the quantity they wish to produce and the technology of generation to produce it
with) the market price will be equal to marginal cost. First, our modelling aims at determining
the optimal short-term management of a flexible nuclear generation set in that competitive
regime. We want to look out to the medium-term horizon which is characterized by the seasonal
variation of demand between winter and summer. Second, there are constraints imposed by the
flexible operation of nuclear units, production and nuclear fuel storage and the supply-demand
equilibrium that play a central role in determining the equilibrium outcomes in this wholesale
electricity market. In view of our framework of perfect competition, we focus on the wholesale
spot market4 assuming that there is no bilateral contracting regime between retailers/consumers
and producers within our model. The wholesale spot prices are paid by the retailers/consumers
directly to the producers.
For simplicity reasons and in the absence of access to detailed data the electricity importa-
4Statistics presented by the French energy regulator (CRE) showed that the volumes traded on the French
wholesale market (intra-day and day-ahead) represented about 12% of the total volumes in 2011 and around
14% in 2012 (Sources: EPEX Spot, EPD, courtiers).
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5tions/exportations are not taken into account within our model. However, in the hypothetical
case that electricity importations/exportations were part of our modelling, they could be con-
sidered either exogenous or endogenous to our model. If they were exogenous then the demand
would be translated by the production that is imported/exported. This would modify the value
of the demand but it would not affect our modelling. On the contrary, if they were endogenous,
the complexity of the modelling would increase since several new parameters have to be taken
into account in our model e.g. technical constraints imposed by the transmission power lines,
the price elasticity of foreign demand, etc.
Our work centers only on the nuclear fuel storage and the optimal management of the nuclear
fuel reservoir without considering the production coming from hydro units with possibility of
storage (peaking5 power plants) because of the additional capacity and storage constraints which
would increase the complexity of the model. There exists an extensive literature that studies
the optimal management of hydro-reservoirs in mixed hydro-non-nuclear thermal competitive
markets and where one can see several modellings of the optimal production problem and notice
the increased level of difficulty from a theoretical and numerical point of view (Ambec, Doucet
(2003), Arellano (2004), Bushnell (2003)).
Similarly, the stochastic nature of the renewable electricity production, from sources such
as wind power and solar power would complicate our model which is the main reason why we
do not take them into consideration. The electricity production coming from renewable energy
plants is variable or intermittent6 because of the stochastic nature of weather patterns. This
means that the renewable energy production should be a stochastic endogenous variable in our
model. Therefore, its consideration would impose to realize a radically different modelling, a
stochastic modelling, whose nature is not consistent with the deterministic character of our
model. Note that mathematical proofs and numerical data can be found in the second chapter
and the annexes of the Ph.D. thesis (Lykidi (2014)).
2.1 Modelling the demand
The demand, being exogenous, is considered perfectly inelastic. It is obviously a simplification.
It can nevertheless be motivated by some arguments. In the short-term to medium-term the
demand is less sensitive to price because it is already determined by previous investments in
electrical devices and ways of life whose evolutions require time. We can also consider that, in
this time scale, the consumers are not able to observe and respond in price evolutions in real
time. Consequently, the sensitivity of demand to price is extremely low. In the case that we add
a price elasticity of demand in our model, it would have an arbitrary value since there are no
specific elements that permit to estimate its value. In the French case, most of the consumers
and a significant part of the firms have a fixed price contract, being a regulated price contract
set by the government and precisely by the French energy regulator (CRE) and the Ministry in
charge of economy and energy. Regulated tariffs do not give information regarding the evolution
of the spot price and therefore, the evolution of the production costs in the wholesale market
which justifies the absence of elasticity of demand within our model. The case of tariffs which
take different values for different hours during a day (hours when demand is high and low,
respectively) gives access to a price relatively close to the spot price but if one aggregates e.g.
5Peaking power plants are power plants that generally run only when there is a high demand, known as peak
demand, for electricity.
6An intermittent energy source is any source of energy that is not continuously available due to some factor
outside direct control. The intermittent source may be quite predictable, for example, tidal power, but cannot
be dispatched to meet the demand of a power system.
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6on a monthly level the result is not pertinent.
In order to obtain a more clear vision of the demand served by the nuclear and thermal
units, we remove the part of the base load demand served by generation units whose electricity
production is “fatal” and they are the first called to meet demand according to the merit or-
der7 (run-of-river8 hydro plants, renewable energy plants). More precisely, the level of demand
observed during a month is translated by the monthly production coming from the run-of-river
hydro plants. Since the hydro technology with no reservoir (run-of-river) is a base load genera-
tion technology which is presumably never marginal, it is necessary to call up nuclear to cover
the different levels of demand. As we explained before, we do not consider the production com-
ing from renewable energy plants because of the variability or intermittency that characterizes
their production level.
In our model, we do not take into consideration the seasonal variations of hydro production
due to precipitation and snow melting because the corresponding data is not available. There-
fore, we assume that the monthly run-of-river hydro-production is constant through the entire
time horizon of our model. This assumption is also based on the relatively low volatility of the
monthly run-of-river hydro-production due to a relatively low standard deviation9 which results
in a smooth evolution of its monthly value close to the mean over a year. This is not the case
for the monthly production coming from renewable energy plants since it is significantly volatile
(high levels of standard deviation) and is spread out over a large number of values during a
year. This does not permit to assume that it is constant over the whole time horizon of the
model and take it into account in the modelling of the demand as we did with the run-of-river
hydro-production.
2.2 Modelling the time horizon
The time horizon of the model is T= 36 months10 beginning by the month of January. We
choose this time horizon because we need a sufficiently long time horizon to follow up the
evolution of the optimal levels of production and nuclear fuel stock as well as the variations
of price and profit. In order to keep our model simple, we assume that the value of profit is
not discounted during the period T . We do not choose a longer time horizon in order to be
consistent with this absence of the discount rate. We can certainly consider longer periods but
the model will be less pertinent.
Let us now proceed with the modelling of the time horizon of the campaign of production. A
French nuclear producer has two main options with respect to the scheduling of fuel reloading
(Source: EDF (2008), CEA (2008)):
• per third (1/3) of fuel reservoir (representing a reloading of reactor’s core per third of its
7The merit order is a way of ranking the available technologies of electricity generation in the same order as
their marginal costs of production. This ranking results in a combination of different generation technologies to
reach the level of demand at a minimum cost. The price in the market is therefore determined by the marginal
cost of the “last technology” used to equilibrate supply and demand (perfect competitive case). This technology
is also called marginal technology.
8The run-of-river hydro plants have little or no capacity for energy storage, hence they can not co-ordinate
the output of electricity generation to match consumer demand. Consequently, they serve as base load power
plants.
9In statistics and probability theory, standard deviation shows how much variation or “dispersion” exists
from the average (mean, or expected value). A low standard deviation indicates that the data points tend to
be very close to the mean; high standard deviation indicates that the data points are spread out over a large
range of values.
10The time horizon of the model is a multiplicative of twelve, being expressed in months. Therefore it could
be modified.
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7full capacity) that corresponds to 18 months of campaign and 396 days equivalent to full
capacity for a unit of 1300 MW (cf. Subsection 2.5),
• per quarter (1/4) of fuel reservoir (representing a reloading of reactor’s core per quarter
of its full capacity) that corresponds to 12 months of campaign and 258 days equivalent
to full capacity for a unit of 1500 MW.
We exclude the case of having both a campaign of 12 and 18 months to avoid complicate our
model and because: (i) any changes on the choice of duration of the campaign have to be
authorized by the Nuclear Safety Authority (NSA) which is tasked, on behalf of the state, with
regulating nuclear safety in order to protect workers, patients, the public and the environment
in France, (ii) of the design of the nuclear fuel rods intended for this specific reactor, (iii) the
optimal allocation of the shutdowns of all 58 nuclear reactors for reloading is decided in advance
according to safety rules imposed by NSA. In order to get a tractable model for our numerical
simulations, we need a cyclic model for the modelling of the campaign. We do not retain the
first modelling, hence a campaign of 18 months because it is not consistent with the “good”
seasonal allocation of shutdowns of the nuclear units. Indeed, if the nuclear producer reloads
fuel in summer when the demand is low the date of the next reloading will be then in winter
when the demand is high. Consequently, we retain a modelling close to the second modelling,
thus a duration of campaign equivalent to 12 months to get a cyclic model with a periodicity
of one year. The one year period can be then broken down into 11 months being the period of
production and 1 month corresponding to the month of reloading of the fuel.
Note that both options11 of fuel reloading result from the operational schema of EDF (Elec-
tricite´ de France) that is strategically chosen in order to optimize the allocation of shutdowns
of nuclear reactors for reloading. We do not deal with the question of the optimal allocation
of shutdowns in this thesis for several reasons: (i) lack of operational data for confidentiality
reasons, (ii) lack of information with regard to the periodical inspections of nuclear reactors
and the inspections imposed by the Nuclear Safety Authority, (iii) it is already determined
by the French nuclear operator (EDF) via a high level computational programming (model
ORION). For all these reasons which are difficult to control in order to endogenously determine
the optimal point of reloading of nuclear fuel and thus, the duration of the campaign within
our model, the scheduling of fuel reloading is entirely exogenous. In our model, our focus is on
optimizing the allocation of the nuclear fuel stored in the reservoir during the different cam-
paigns of production for a reloading pattern provided by the French nuclear operator via the
model ORION.
2.3 Modelling the generating units
We study a competitive electricity market with N > 2 producers who manage both nuclear
and thermal generating units. A producer n = 1, · · · , N can operate with all types of nuclear
generating units. In addition, each producer disposes of a certain amount of thermal capacity.
2.3.1 Concept of type
Among the nuclear generating units, we distinguish several essential intrinsic characteristics:
• available nuclear capacity,
• minimum capacity when in use,
11In the case of a unit of 900 MW, the scheduling of fuel reloading is the following: (i) 1/3 of fuel reservoir
that corresponds to 18 months of campaign and 385 days equivalent to full capacity, (ii) 1/4 of fuel reservoir
that corresponds to 12 months of campaign and 280 days equivalent to full capacity.
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8• month of their fuel reloading.
In our model, the minimum capacity is proportional to the available capacity, and this pro-
portion is the same for all “physical” nuclear reactors. Therefore, for each “physical” nuclear
reactor, we will focus on the month of fuel reloading, which permits us to define twelve “types”
of nuclear units. Each type indexed by j = 1, · · · , 12 corresponds to a different month of reload-
ing of the nuclear unit. Then, a unit which belongs to the type of unit j = 1 (respectively
j = 2, · · · , j = 12) shuts down in January (respectively February, · · · , December).
A nuclear plant12 may contain several “physical” nuclear reactors, which (for operational
reasons) do not reload on the same month. The characteristic “type” for the nuclear case
is not related to the plant but to the reactor. Each producer n = 1, · · · , N owns a precise
number of “physical” nuclear reactors that are grouped according to the month of reloading
(independently of the locations) in order to constitute units. Therefore, it can hold a certain
level of capacity from each type of nuclear unit.
For the thermal units, the modelling is the same except that the minimum capacity is equal
to zero and that there is no month of reloading. There is a unique type of thermal units.
2.3.2 Notations
The level of the nuclear production during the month t = 1, · · · , T for the unit j of producer n
will be denoted by qnucnjt . Moreover, the maximum nuclear production that can be realized by
the unit j of producer n during a month is given by the parameter Qn,j,nucmax , while the minimum
nuclear production is equal to Qn,j,nucmin .
The level of the thermal production during the month t = 1, · · · , T for the producer n will
be denoted by qthnt. Furthermore, the maximum thermal production during a month for the
producer n is given by the parameter Qn,thmax and corresponds to the nominal thermal capacity
of producer n, while there is no minimum for thermal production Qn,thmin = 0.
2.4 Modelling the production costs
The cost functions of both nuclear and thermal production are common among the different
producers. The nuclear cost function is made of a fixed part determined by the cost of invest-
ment, the fixed cost of exploitation and taxes and a variable part which corresponds to the
variable cost of exploitation and fuel cost (see page 18, Subsection 4.1). We assume that the
cost function of the nuclear production is affine and defined as
Cnucn,j (q
nuc
njt ) = a
n,j
nuc + bnucq
nuc
njt .
The thermal cost function is also made of a fixed part which corresponds to the cost of
investment, the fixed cost of exploitation and taxes and a variable part covering the variable
cost of exploitation, the fuel cost, the cost of CO2 as well as the taxes on the gas fuel (see page
18, Subsection 4.1). We assume that the thermal production has a quadratic cost function
Cthn (.) which is the following:
Cthn (q
th
nt) = a
n
th + bthq
th
nt + c
n
thq
th
nt
2
.
Proposition 2.1 The coefficients involved in the cost functions are determined by the capacity.
• The fixed part anth of the thermal cost function is proportional to the capacity Q
n,th
max while
the coefficients bth, c
n
th of the variable part of the thermal cost function are such that: (i)
12A nuclear power plant is a thermal power station in which the heat source arises from nuclear reactions.
A nuclear unit is the set that consists of two parts: the reactor which produces heat to boil water and make
steam and the electricity generation system in which one associates: the turbine and the generator. The steam
drives the turbine which turns the shaft of the generator to produce electricity (Source: SFEN).
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9bth does not depend on the capacity Q
n,th
max, (ii) c
n
th is inversely proportional to the capacity
Qn,thmax.
• The coefficient an,jnuc is proportional to the capacity Q
n,j,nuc
max since it corresponds to the fixed
part of the nuclear cost function.
Proof
A proof of this proposition is given in the Ph.D. thesis on pages 92− 93 (Lykidi (2014)).

The nuclear and thermal cost functions are monotone increasing and convex functions of qnucnjt
and qthnt respectively. We choose a quadratic cost function for thermal because the marginal
cost of the thermal production is increasing since it results from different fossil fuel generation
technologies (e.g. coal, gas). Furthermore, the thermal production needed a non constant
(increasing) marginal cost function to recover its fixed costs.
2.5 Modelling the nuclear fuel stock
Following the modelling of the production constraints, we will model the nuclear fuel stock and
the associated constraints. We denote Sn,jreload, the nuclear fuel stock of reloading available to
the unit j of producer n. Rather than expressing this stock in kilograms of uranium or number
of nuclear fuel rods, we will express it thanks to the conversion between the quantity of energy
and the corresponding number of days of operation at full capacity. The number of days of
operation equivalent to full capacity is constant for all j, n and does not exceed the 11 months
which permits and obliges at the same time the modulation of the nuclear production. The
nuclear fuel stock of reloading Sn,jreload is equal to the corresponding capacity of the units of type
j of producer n (Capacityn,j,nuc) multiplied by the number of hours equivalent to full capacity
during a campaign. More precisely, one has:
Sn,jreload = 1× Capacity
n,j,nuc × Number of days equivalent to full capacity×24
where the number 1 makes clear that we reason over a campaign of production.
The dynamic variable which constitutes the nuclear fuel stock of a unit over time is Sn,jt
which by convention represents the quantity of fuel stored in the nuclear reservoir and available
to the unit j of producer n at the beginning of the month t. Obviously, we have Sn,jt > 0.
The evolution of the nuclear fuel stock is classic and is determined by the following rules:
Sn,j1 given, S
n,j
t+1 =
{
Sn,jt − q
nuc
njt , if no reload during month t for unit j
Sn,jreload, if unit j reloads during month t
(1)
We have only to take into account the question of reloading. In the case that t is the month
during which the producer n reloads the fuel of the reactor, the stock at the beginning of the
following month (beginning of the campaign) is equal to Sn,jreload.
We also impose
Sn,jT+1 > S
n,j
1 (2)
The constraint (2) implies that a producer must keep its nuclear units at the end of the game
at the same storage level as the initial one. A producer has to finish the period T at least with
the same quantity of nuclear fuel as the initial one. In this way the producer has to “spare” its
nuclear fuel during the production period. The consideration of this constraint is motivated by
some arguments:
• The absence of this constraint could lead to an “over-consumption” of the nuclear fuel
stock in order to reach the maximum nuclear production level; this could generate some
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negative effects (e.g. insufficient level of stock to reach at least the minimum nuclear
production level during some months t = 37, 38, etc. (excluding the month of reloading)).
• The constraint (2) guarantees that the producer will start a new cycle of simulations of
36 months with a quantity of stock at least equal to Sn,j1 at the beginning of the game.
Such a constraint is implicit for unit j if the end of period T coincides with the end of the
campaign of unit j.
The nuclear production qnucnjt during a campaign (11 months) for the unit j of producer n can
not exceed the nuclear fuel stock of reloading Sn,jreload available to the unit j of producer n at the
beginning of the campaign. For example, given the schema stock-production flow represented
by (1) and the positivity of the nuclear fuel stock (Sn,jt > 0), the nuclear production q
nuc
n1t
realized by the unit 1 of producer n during its first campaign is such that:
12∑
t=2
qnucn1t 6 S
n,1
reload (3)
We recall that the nuclear units of type j = 1 reload their nuclear fuel in January. From the
constraint (3) and (1), we deduce that the producer n finishes the campaigns with a quantity
of stock superior or equal to zero. However, a producer spends all its nuclear fuel stock of
reloading Sn,jreload during a campaign. Several reasons lead us to this ascertainment:
• The length of a campaign is given by the maximum number of days during which a nuclear
unit produces until exhaustion of its fuel of reloading.
• The evaluation of the variable part (bnuc) of the nuclear cost function which partially
corresponds to the fuel cost is based on the fact that a producer uses all the available
nuclear fuel stock: if a producer keeps paying in order to obtain the fuel stock Sn,jreload even
in the case that it does not consume all the stock during a campaign, then this cost should
be regarded as a fixed cost which is paid at the beginning of each campaign. Consequently,
the fuel cost should be integrated into the fixed part of the nuclear cost function, which
means that the coefficient an,jnuc and thus the nuclear cost would be modified.
• The cost that a producer undergoes to get rid of the unused nuclear fuel at the end of
the campaigns (cost related to the reprocessing of nuclear fuel).
Note also that there exists an obvious analogy with Walras’ Law where the inequality budget
constraint is represented as an equality.
For these reasons, the constraint (3) will now take the form:
12∑
t=2
qnucn1t = S
n,1
reload (4)
Similarly, the constraint (2) can not hold as inequality constraint (Sn,jT+1 > S
n,j
1 ) which means
that the surplus of stock at the end of the game is zero. Thus, the constraint (2) will become:
Sn,jT+1 = S
n,j
1 (5)
Note that if j = 1, then the condition (5) becomes Sn,1T+1 = S
n,1
1 = 0 which is obviously true.
In view of the above ascertainment regarding the exhaustion of the nuclear fuel stock at the
end of campaigns, the nuclear fuel constraints for the nuclear unit j of producer n are defined
in the table that follows:
We observe that the nuclear units of type {2, · · · , 11} have two additional constraints than
the nuclear units of type 1 and 12. This is due to the presence, at the beginning and end of
the game, of campaigns that we will qualify as incomplete.
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j=1 j ∈ {2, · · · , 11} j=12∑12
t=2 q
nuc
n1t = S
n,1
reload
∑j−1
t=1 q
nuc
njt = S
n,j
1
∑11
t=1 q
nuc
n12t = S
n,12
reload∑24
t=14 q
nuc
n1t = S
n,1
reload
∑j+12−1
t=j+1 q
nuc
njt = S
n,j
reload
∑23
t=13 q
nuc
n12t = S
n,12
reload∑T
t=26 q
nuc
n1t = S
n,1
reload
∑j+2·12−1
t=j+12+1 q
nuc
njt = S
n,j
reload
∑T−1
t=25 q
nuc
n12t = S
n,12
reload∑T
t=j+2·12+1 q
nuc
njt = S
n,j
reload − S
n,j
1
Table 1
2.6 Number of optimization variables and of optimization constraints
In our model, the total number of optimization variables is equal to N · (J · T + T ) = N · (12 ·
36 + 36) = N · 468. The number of constraints resulting from the equality between supply and
demand is T = 36. In addition, the number of nuclear fuel constraints is N · ((2 ·K + 1) · (J −
2)+ (2 ·K) · 2) = N · ((2 · 3+ 1) · (12− 2)+ (2 · 3) · 2) = N · 82, where K represents the number
of campaigns within our model. Lastly, the number of minimum and maximum nuclear and
thermal production constraints is equal to N · (J ·T +T ) = N · (12 · 36+ 36) = N · 468. Hence,
the total number of optimization constraints is equal to N · 550 + 36. Even in the case of a
unique producer (N = 1), the number of variables (468) and of optimization constraints (586)
are quite large which leads to computational difficulties. This is because, the level of difficulty
of the numerical program to compute a solution of an optimization problem is increasing with
respect to the size of the model (number of optimization variables, number of optimization
constraints).
In general, computational difficulties can result from: (i) the difficulty of the numerical
program in calculating a global optimum since it can stop running when it finds a first solution
which could be a local optimum of the optimization problem and not proceeding until it finds
a global optimum, (ii) the sensibility of calculations with regard to the initial point that one
chooses so that the program start running (different initial points can lead to different results),
(iii) the duration of calculations which is increasing with respect to the size of the model.
3 Equilibrium and approaches of calculation
In this section, we introduce the notion of a merit order equilibrium in the case of several
producers (N > 2). Then, we present our different approaches to calculate a merit order
equilibrium.
3.1 The notion of merit order equilibrium
Let us introduce the definition of a merit order equilibrium with respect to a system of prices
p ∈ RT+.
Definition 3.1 The production vector (qn)
N
n=1 = (((q
nuc
1jt )
J
j=1, q
th
1t)
T
t=1, · · · , ((q
nuc
Njt)
J
j=1, q
th
Nt)
T
t=1)
is a merit order equilibrium with respect to a system of prices p ∈ RT+ if:
(i) for all n, qn is a feasible production vector: (a) it respects the nuclear fuel constraints,
for all j and (b) it respects the minimum/maximum production constraints, for all j, t.
(ii) the price, at each month t, is determined by the marginal cost of the marginal technology.
It is called the merit order price associated with the production vector (qn)
N
n=1.
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(iii) at each date t, it respects the equality between supply and demand
N∑
n=1
(
J∑
j=1
qnucnjt + q
th
nt) = Dt −Q
hyd
t . (6)
Let us now give some precisions to each condition ((i), (ii), (iii)) that makes part of the
definition of the merit order equilibrium in order to better understand it. More precisely, we
specify that:
(i) The nuclear fuel constraints for the unit j are provided by subsection 2.5 of this paper.
The minimum/maximum nuclear and thermal production constraints take the form{
Qn,j,nucmin 6 q
nuc
njt 6 Q
n,j,nuc
max , if no reload during month t for unit j
qnucnjt = 0, if unit j reloads during month t
(7)
0 6 qthnt 6 Q
n,th
max (8)
(ii) In view of the subsection 2.2.4 where we determine the nuclear and thermal production
costs, the merit order price p associated with a feasible production vector (qn)
N
n=1, p = (pt)
T
t=1 =
(Φnt(qnt))
T
t=1 = (Φnt(q
nuc
nt , q
th
nt))
T
t=1 = (Φnt((q
nuc
njt )
J
j=1, q
th
nt))
T
t=1 = Φn(qn) is calculated in month t
as follows:
pt = Φnt(qnt) =
{
mcthn (q
th
nt), if q
th
nt > 0
mcnuc(qnucnjt ), if q
th
nt = 0
=
{
bth + 2c
n
thq
th
nt, if q
th
nt > 0
bnuc, if q
th
nt = 0
(9)
The price is calculated independently of n because according to Proposition 2.1 on page 8, the
variable part of the thermal cost cnth is inversely proportional to the capacity Q
n,th
max which means
that there exists λ ∈ R such that cnth =
λ
Qn,thmax
. Hence, in the case that qthnt > 0, we have
pt = bth + 2c
n
thq
th
nt = bth + 2
λ
Qn,thmax
qthnt = bth + 2λ
qthnt
Qn,thmax
= bth + 2λrt
where rt =
qthnt
Qn,thmax
is the rate of use of the thermal capacity at time t. It varies over time while
it is constant from one producer to another. We emphasize that the merit order price pt is
discontinuous on production vectors whose thermal component qthnt is equal to zero (see Figure
1 on page 13).
3.2 Supply behaviour with respect to the merit order price
In this section, we describe the supply behaviour with respect to the merit order price in
order to show why producers can not decide on operating the nuclear units given an externally
determined intertemporal pattern of prices (e.g. from European Energy Exchange) even if one
assumes they can perfectly foresee. From a theoretical and numerical perspective, we expose
the barriers of computing a merit order equilibrium. This leads producers to make decisions
based on the patterns of seasonal demand.
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bth
Price
Non-nuclear thermal production
bnuc
Nuclear is marginal
pt
qnt
th
Figure 1: Price discontinuity
3.2.1 First theoretical difficulty of computing a merit order equilibrium
Let us consider a feasible production vector (qn)
N
n=1 = ((qnt)
T
t=1)
N
n=1 = ((q
nuc
nt , q
th
nt)
T
t=1)
N
n=1 =
(((qnucnjt )
J
j=1, q
th
nt))
T
t=1)
N
n=1. We can associate to this production a price p = Φn(qn) or equivalently
(qn)
N
n=1 = (Φ
−1
n (p))
N
n=1 = ((Φ
−1
nt (pt))
T
t=1)
N
n=1. We indicate (((Φ
−1
nt )
nuc
(pt))
T
t=1)
N
n=1 the nuclear
component and (((Φ−1nt )
th
(pt))
T
t=1)
N
n=1 the thermal component of the function ((Φ
−1
nt (pt))
T
t=1)
N
n=1.
From a theoretical point of view, supply does not behave well with respect to the merit order
price within our model because Φ−1n (.) is not a function but a correspondence of the merit order
price. This means that a set of different feasible production levels (and not a single feasible
production level) are associated with the price.
More precisely, given the relationship (9), there is a distinction between the thermal pro-
duction of producer n in the month t which is a function (and not a correspondence) of the
form
(Φ−1nt )
th
(pt) = q
th
nt(pt) =
{
pt − bth
2cnth
, if pt > bth
0, if pt 6 bth
(10)
and the nuclear production (Φ−1nt )
nuc
(pt) = q
nuc
nt (pt) (of producer n with respect to the price pt
in the month t) which is not a function of the price. From a mathematical point of view, if we
analyze (9), one has pt = Φnt(qnt) = Φnt(q
nuc
nt , q
th
nt) but in fact, the function Φnt(.) is independent
of the first argument i.e. the nuclear production. Consequently, the function Φnt(.) can not
be one-to-one13. Therefore, we will never have unicity of the value of the nuclear production
of producer n for a given value of the price pt in the month t. In particular, when nuclear
is the marginal technology i.e. pt = bnuc, the nuclear production can take any value for this
value of price in order to maximize profit. Classically, the coordination of producers is realized
by the “invisible hand”, a mechanism which is based on the evolution of price and the choice
of the optimal production levels according to it. However, it is not the case here considering
the fact that nuclear production is a correspondence within our model and thus, price signals
can not lead to an equilibrium of the optimal production problem. Inevitably, coordination
13A function f(.) is called one-to-one or injective if f(a) 6= f(b) for any two different elements a, b of the
domain of the function.
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issues between producers at a production level will come up. Each producer having a range
of feasible nuclear production options would have to coordinate with all producers so that the
overall equilibrium between demand and production (resulting from all producers) is respected
each month and its profit is maximized at the same time.
3.2.2 Second theoretical difficulty of computing a merit order equilibrium
In figure 1, if bnuc < pt < bth then there is no correspondence (((Φ
−1
nt (pt))
T
t=1)
N
n=1) since the
nuclear production (Φ−1nt )
nuc
(pt) of producer n in the month t is an empty set. Therefore, we
can not compute the production Φ−1nt (pt) of producer n by looking at the merit order price pt
during the month t.
3.2.3 Numerical difficulty of computing a merit order equilibrium
In the case that the nuclear production of producer n ((qnucnjt (pt))
J
j=1)
T
t=1 was a function of the
merit order price and not a correspondence, the problem would be different. More precisely, in
view of the inter-temporal management of the nuclear fuel stock (see page 10, Subsection 2.5),
the system operator has to look at the equality between supply and demand over the entire time
horizon T of the model in order to determine the price within the merit order equilibrium. In
this typical case of T = 36 months and by taking as example the simplest case of one aggregate
producer (N = 1), we have to deal with a large non linear system∑12
j=1 q
nuc
jt (pt) + q
th
t (pt) = Dt −Q
hyd
t , for all t
of 36 equations involving 36 unknowns ((pt)
T
t=1) which is difficult to solve numerically.
Note that this system is based on the auxiliary variables qnucjt , q
th
t whose number is J ·T+T =
12 · 36 + 36 = 468.
In view of the above theoretical and numerical difficulties, we conclude that it is not possible
to calculate a merit order equilibrium by looking at the inter-temporal pattern of prices in this
first approach.
3.3 A second approach to calculate a merit order equilibrium
In this approach, each producer n operating with a certain level of nuclear capacity of unit
j and an amount of thermal capacity determines its optimal level of supply ((qnucnjt )
J
j=1, q
th
nt)
during the month t via the maximization of its current profit given the optimal production
levels realized in the previous months.
At time t, the producer n could try to solve the following optimal production problem:
max
(((qnucνjτ )
J
j=1,q
th
ντ )
T
τ=1)
N
ν=1∈G
t
pt · (
J∑
j=1
qnucnjt + q
th
nt)−
J∑
j=1
Cnucnj (q
nuc
njt )− C
th
n (q
th
nt) (11)
where pt is a given parameter and G
t is the set of feasible solutions of the optimization problem
(11) defined as
Gt =
(((qnucνjτ )Jj=1, qthντ )Tτ=1)Nν=1 ∈ K s.t.
qnucνjτ = q˜
nuc
νjτ , for all ν, j and for all τ < t
qthντ = q˜
th
ντ , for all ν and for all τ < t
Qν,j,nucmin 6 q
nuc
νjτ 6 Q
ν,j,nuc
max , for all ν, j and for all τ
0 6 qthντ 6 Q
ν,th
max, for all ν and for all τ

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The set K is defined by all the production vectors of the form q = ((qnucνj1 )
J
j=1, · · · , (q
nuc
νjT )
J
j=1,
qthν1, · · · , q
th
νT )
N
ν=1 that respect the nuclear fuel constraints for all ν as well as the supply-demand
equilibrium constraint∑N
ν=1(
∑12
j=1 q
nuc
νjt + q
th
νt) = Dt −Q
hyd
t , in month t.
For simplicity reasons, we used the notation Gt which is the reduced form of the notation
Gt((((q˜nucνjτ )
J
j=1, q˜
th
ντ )
t−1
τ=1)
N
ν=1) where (((q˜
nuc
νjτ )
J
j=1, q˜
th
ντ )
t−1
τ=1)
N
ν=1 is the optimal production vector of
the months preceding the month t. In the set of feasible solutions Gt, we look at the production
realized in all months until the month t because of the inter-temporal nature of nuclear fuel
constraints. In view of the construction of the set of feasible solutions Gt in the month t, we
deduce that G1 ⊆ G2 ⊆ · · · ⊆ GT .
A production vector (((qnucνjτ )
J
j=1, q
th
ντ )
T
τ=1)
N
ν=1 is an equilibrium of the optimal short-term
optimization problem (11) if it is a merit order equilibrium and in addition to this it maximizes
the profit of the producer ν during the month t on the set of feasible solutions Gt, for all ν, t.
However, this approach could be qualified as “short sighted” since the equality between
supply and demand in future periods is not taken into consideration in the optimization problem
(11). This may lead to a failure of the system to equilibrate supply and demand in future
periods while at the same time respecting production and nuclear fuel constraints. In fact,
in our numerical example, we find that there exists a month t ∈ {1, · · · , T} such that the
set of feasible solutions Gt is empty. More precisely, we verify (through a numerical test) the
nonexistence of feasible solutions within the set G16 in April (t = 16) of the second year of
period T . We intentionally present here a mistaken approach in order to show that too high
a level of “short-sightedness” with regards to future demand is not bearable. The equality
between supply and demand has to be seen with a minimum anticipation in order to manage
the current use of the resevoir. For this reason, we proceed with the next and final approach
to calculate a merit order equilibrium.
3.4 Final approach to calculate a merit order equilibrium
In view of the second approach to calculate a merit order equilibrium, the nuclear set has to be
managed so that the equality between supply and demand is respected over the whole period T .
For this reason, we provide a third and final approach to calculate a merit order equilibrium in
order to take into account the supply-demand equilibrium constraint in future periods within
the set of feasible solutions of the optimization problem (11).
More precisely, at time t, the producer n may attempt to solve the following optimal pro-
duction problem
max
(((qnucνjτ )
J
j=1,q
th
ντ )
T
τ=1)
N
ν=1∈H
t
pt · (
J∑
j=1
qnucnjt + q
th
nt)−
J∑
j=1
Cnucnj (q
nuc
jt )− C
th
n (q
th
t ) (12)
where H t is the set of feasible solutions of the optimization problem (12) defined as follows:
H t =
(((qnucνjτ )Jj=1, qthντ )Tτ=1)Nν=1 ∈M s.t.
qnucνjτ = q˜
nuc
νjτ , for all ν, j and for all τ < t
qthντ = q˜
th
ντ , for all ν and for all τ < t
Qν,j,nucmin 6 q
nuc
νjτ 6 Q
ν,j,nuc
max , for all ν, j and for all τ
0 6 qthντ 6 Q
ν,th
max, for all ν and for all τ

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The set M is defined by all the production vectors of the form q = ((qnucνj1 )
J
j=1, · · · , (q
nuc
νjT )
J
j=1,
qthν1, · · · , q
th
νT )
N
ν=1 that respect the nuclear fuel constraints for all ν as well as the supply-demand
equilibrium constraint ∑N
ν=1(
∑12
j=1 q
nuc
νjt + q
th
νt) = Dt −Q
hyd
t , for all t.
The set M differs from the set K defined in our previous approach to calculate a merit or-
der equilibrium because, in this approach, the producer n ensures that supply will meet de-
mand during the entire time horizon of the model. To simplify, the notation H t is used for
H t((((q˜nucνjτ )
J
j=1, q˜
th
ντ )
t−1
τ=1)
N
ν=1) where (((q˜
nuc
νjτ )
J
j=1, q˜
th
ντ )
t−1
τ=1)
N
ν=1 is the optimal production realized in
the months preceding the month t. The set H t has the same properties with those mentioned
for the set Gt.
The optimal short-term production problem (12) determines the supply of the producer
n ((qnucnjt )
J
j=1, q
th
nt) during the month t, given the optimal nuclear and thermal production
(((q˜nucnjτ )
J
j=1, q˜
th
nτ )
t−1
τ=1) realized in the previous months. A production vector (((q
nuc
νjτ )
J
j=1, q
th
ντ )
T
τ=1)
N
ν=1
is an equilibrium if it is a merit order equilibrium and it maximizes the profit of the producer
ν during the month t on the set of feasible solutions H t, for all ν, t.
3.4.1 The decrease of short-term profit in the absence of thermal production
Under some rather mild assumptions (satisfied by our numerical data), we show that the absence
of thermal production during the month t induces a decrease of the profit during this month
which results from a decrease of the price.
Let us focus on the set H tth defined as
H tth =
(((qnucνjτ )Jj=1, qthντ )Tτ=1)Nν=1 ∈M s.t.
qnucνjτ = q˜
nuc
νjτ , for all ν, j and for all τ < t
qthντ = q˜
th
ντ , for all ν and for all τ < t
Qν,j,nucmin 6 q
nuc
νjτ 6 Q
ν,j,nuc
max , for all ν, j and for all τ
0 < qthνt 6 Q
ν,th
max, for all ν

The price is determined by the thermal production during the month t in the set H tth.
Remark 3.1 For all t ∈ {1, · · · , T}, H tth is contained in H
t and H t is contained in M (H tth ⊂
H t ⊂M).
We will now make use of Proposition 3.1 in order to prove the decrease of the profit at
production vectors with zero levels of thermal production at date t.
Proposition 3.1 For all t ∈ {1, · · · , T}, if H tth is a non-empty set, then the closure of H
t
th is
equal to H t (H tth = H
t).
Proof
A proof of this proposition appears in our Ph.D. thesis on page 112 (Lykidi (2014)).

From a geometrical point of view, it results from Proposition 3.1 that all the points of the
set H t and consequently those which belong to H t \ H tth and therefore characterized by zero
levels of thermal production in the month t can be approached by points that belong to H tth.
This result plays a central role in order to prove in the next proposition the discontinuity
(decrease) of the profit at these particular points due to the discontinuity (decrease) of the
price (discontinuous problems have been analyzed in an economic framework (cf. for example
Bich and Laraki (2011)).
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2014.57
17
Proposition 3.2 For all t ∈ {1, · · · , T}, for all n ∈ {1, · · · , N}, if H tth is a non-empty set,
bnuc < bth and q ∈ H
t \H tth, then there exists a sequence (qr)r∈N ∈ H
t
th with limr→∞ qr = q such
that limr→∞ pi
n
t (qr) > pi
n
t (q).
Proof
A proof of this proposition is given in our Ph.D. thesis on pages 113− 114 (Lykidi (2014)).

Notice that the non-emptiness of the setH tth obviously depends on the values of the exogenous
variables (Qn,j,nucmax , Q
n,j,nuc
min , Q
n,th
max, S
n,j
reload, S
n,j
1 , Dt, Q
hyd
t ).
The inequality bnuc < bth holds within our data; thus, according to Proposition 3.2, the profit
at date t decreases for all the production vectors whose thermal component at this date is equal
to zero. Consequently, it is not profitable for a producer who wants to maximize its profit to
run only its nuclear units and be remunerated at a price pt = bnuc. Therefore, the producer will
search for a solution that maximizes its profit among the production vectors of the set H tth.
The following corollary establishes the relation between the optimal short-term production
problem on H t and the optimal short-term production problem on H tth.
Corollary 3.1 The current monthly profit maximization problem determined on H t is equiva-
lent to the current monthly profit maximization problem determined on H tth (same set of solu-
tions and same value14), for all t.
Proof
This corollary is an obvious consequence of Proposition 3.2.

It should be mentioned that, for all t, the value of both optimization problems exists (in
the real line) since the profit function is polynomial and the set H t along with the set H tth are
bounded. We also notice that that if the problem (12) is determined on H t which is a compact
set, the objective function is not continuous according to Proposition 3.2 (see page 17). If the
problem (12) is determined on H tth, the objective function is continuous in view of Proposition
3.2 while the set H tth is not compact. Hence, it is not possible to conclude on the existence of
solutions of this problem (cf. for example Varian (1992)). If a solution of the optimal short-
term production problem on H tth exists for all t, then it constitutes an equilibrium since all the
conditions in order to be a merit order equilibrium are met and it maximizes the profit in the
month t (see Corollary 3.1 and Definition 3.1 on page 11). In the next section, we provide a
numerical illustration of this problem.
3.4.2 A property of the short-term profit function and its implications
The following lemma shows the concavity of the profit function of the optimal short-term
production problem determined on H tth.
Lemma 3.1 For all t ∈ {1, · · · , T}, for all n ∈ {1, · · · , N} the profit function of the current
monthly profit maximization problem on H tth is concave with respect to qnt.
Proof
A proof of this lemma is provided in our Ph.D. thesis on page 116 (Lykidi (2014)).

14The value of an optimization problem is defined as the upper bound of the set {f(x)|x ∈ C}, where f is the
objective function and C is the set of feasible solutions. The value always exists even if the set of solutions is
empty. When the set of solutions is nonempty, the value of an optimization problem is the common value f(x)
for any solution x.
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Remark 3.2 The strict concavity of the profit function pint with respect to the thermal produc-
tion qthnt implies the unicity of solutions regarding the thermal component for all n, t. However,
if we consider the other variables which do not affect the profit pint and according to the proof of
Lemma 3.1 the profit function pint is concave with regard to qnt for all n, t which does not imply
necessarily the unicity of the entire solution.
4 Numerical modelling
In this section, we provide an analytical description of our data set. Then, we study the
nuclear and thermal production decisions coming from the resolution of the optimal short-term
production problem analyzed in the previous section 3.4, within a simple numerical model
solved with Scilab.
4.1 Data
The data used in our numerical dynamic model is French. It is of several years due to the
difficulty of collection: ∗ level of French demand during the year 2007, ∗ generation capacity
of hydro (run-of-river), nuclear and thermal, ∗ nuclear fuel stock of reloading and ∗ fixed and
variable costs of nuclear, coal and gas generation.
Consumption data comes from the French Transmission & System Operator (named RTE).
It gives the hourly consumption in MW for the entire year 2007 which we use to determine
the monthly consumption. This data takes into account the electricity losses of the network,
as estimated by RTE. RTE also provides the annual capacity of nuclear, gas and coal for the
year 2009. The annual capacity and production of hydro and the nuclear fuel stock of reloading
have been provided by EDF. The costs of production come from the official report “Reference
Costs of Electricity Production” issued by the ministry of industry (DGEMP & DIDEME
(2003, 2008)). The report gives the total cost for each technology as follows: investment cost,
variable and fixed cost of exploitation, fuel cost, taxes, R&D costs and cost of CO2 per ton for
nuclear (EPR reactor), coal and gas given the level of operation (base load (8760h) and semi-
base (3000h) operation). These costs are estimated for the year 2007 and 2015 with different
discount rates (3%, 5%, 8%, 11%) taking into account the influence of exchange rate on the
production cost.
4.1.1 Specific data assumptions for our numerical modelling
Our modelling is based on a scenario in which one dollar is equal to one euro, the discount rate
is 8%, the cost of CO2 per ton reaches 20 euros, the price of coal is 30 dollars per ton and the
price of gas is 3.3 dollars per MBtu (1 MBtu/h = 293.1 kWh). The choice of this particular
scenario is mainly based on the scenario considered by DGEMP & DIDEME in 2003 for the
estimation of costs of the different types of generation technologies in 2007.
In view of the quadratic form of the thermal production cost, we need to specify that the value
of the coefficient ath corresponds to the fixed cost of coal and gas while the other coefficients
have been determined by interpolation in order to meet the variable cost provided by our data.
The consideration of the fixed costs of both technologies (nuclear, thermal) permits to obtain
a more realistic vision of the profit within our medium-term horizon.
The capacity of each nuclear unit has been simulated15 in order to approximate the graph
15Access to detailed nuclear capacity data for each short period of time is not possible due to the confidentiality
of such data.
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2014.57
19
0 10 20 30 40 50
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
Consumption 2006 (TWh)Number of shut-down units (2006)
Time (weeks)
Figure 2: Availability of nuclear units, Source: EDF (2006)
of figure16 2. For example, the capacity of the nuclear unit j = 1 (respectively j = 2, · · · , j =
12) corresponds to the average capacity of shut-down nuclear units in January (respectively
February, · · · , December) whose calculation has the difficulty that a month is not composed
of an integer of weeks. This has to be considered in order to compute the average number
of shut-down nuclear units and thus, the average nuclear capacity every month. The french
nuclear set is composed of different types of nuclear reactors with different levels of capacity
and we do not dispose a detailed data of the information for figure 2. The initial value of the
nuclear fuel stock (Sj1) has been set by simulating the nuclear fuel stock of each unit j available
at the beginning of the time horizon of the model.
The number of days (or number of hours) equivalent to full capacity is calculated within
our model as the product of the operating factor of a nuclear reactor (Ku percentage of time
that the reactor is used at its maximum capacity during its availability period) and the number
of days (or number of hours) of a given year: Ku · 365 ≈ 0.70 · 365 ≈ 256. This number is
almost identical with the number of days (or number of hours) during which a reactor of 1500
MW operates at full capacity in the case of a campaign of 12 months following the operational
schema of EDF (see page 6, Subsection 2.2).
Finally, a nuclear unit can vary its capacity level between the nominal capacity and the
technical minimum. In the case of an EPR, load follow17 enables planned variations in en-
ergy demand to be followed and can be activated between 25% of nominal capacity (technical
minimum) and 100% of nominal capacity (technical maximum) (NEA/AEN (2011)). In our
numerical model, the minimum nuclear production is the 25% of the capacity of the units of
type j i.e. 0.25· Capacityj,nuc and the maximum nuclear production is the 100% of the capacity
of the units of type j i.e. 1· Capacityj,nuc.
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Figure 3: Simulated demand (in MW)
4.1.2 Numerical simulation of the levels of monthly demand.
The amounts of monthly demand18 Dt obtained for the period January 2007 - December 2009
are presented in figure19 3. In particular, the values of monthly demand during the period
January 2007 - December 2007 come from our historical data. Then, we reproduce these values
by applying a positive rate on the monthly demand for the years that follow (2008 and 2009). We
suppose an augmentation of the demand level by a rate of 1% per year to take into account the
increasing trend of demand from one year to another. This implies a non periodic evolution of
demand over time. One can see the seasonal variation of demand between winter (high demand
in November-February) and summer (low demand in April - August). Part of the information
is produced by the aggregation of the data since it takes into consideration the monthly levels
of demand20 and not the hourly levels of demand. Indeed, if we compare the peak monthly
demand with the peak hourly demand for a given year, we could observe a difference between
them. For the year 2007, the peak daily demand which is 80403 MW corresponds to an average
hourly demand of 3350.1 MW that is inferior than 3352.5 MW corresponding to the peak hourly
demand observed in our historical data.
16Each blue bar shows the number of shut-down nuclear units during a week and the red line shows the
evolution of the consumption over time. The different levels of consumption are measured on the right axis
while the number of shut-down nuclear units is reflected on the left axis.
17The minimum requirements for the maneuverability capabilities of modern reactors are defined by the
utilities requirements that are based on the requirements of the grid operators.
18Note that we did a rescaling on this data to take into account the diversity on the length of the months.
19In our numerical model, the unit of energy used for measuring demand, stock and production is the MWh.
20Note that the monthly demand in 2007 results from the aggregation of the hourly demand found within our
historical data.
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4.1.3 Numerical results deduced from our data set
Let us now provide a couple of numerical results obtained within our data set:
• In view of our modelling of the nuclear production cost and the value of its coefficients
computed in this data (which is calculated for the year 2007), we determine the average
nuclear cost evaluated here at 37.25 euros per MWh. This price of the nuclear MWh is very
close to the range of nuclear electricity prices21 (37.5 - 38.8 euros per MWh) appeared in
the analysis of the Regulatory Commission of Energy (CRE) before Fukushima accident.
It does not take a value significantly lower than 37.5 euros per MWh as it was asserted
by alternative producers in order to compete EDF. However, it does not exceed the 38.8
euros per MWh (being eventually close to the price of 42 euros per MWh set by the
French government to contribute to the security of supply of France and the work that
EDF might have to start to enhance nuclear safety after Fukushima disaster in Mars 2011
(Les Echos (20/04/2011)) which is totally understandable since the cost evaluations of
DGEMP & DIDEME do not take into account the extra costs resulting from measures
intended to improve nuclear safety after Fukushima accident.
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Figure 4: Thermal profit (in Euro (million))
• In order to examine whether the thermal production is profitable or not and the potential
to pay for the cost coming from it every month, we determine the threshold of profitability
of the thermal production realized by N producers (considered also as one aggregate
producer) during the month t (θN). To do this, we take the profit resulting from the
aggregate monthly thermal production equal to zero: θN = N
√
ath
cth . If the monthly
thermal production level realized by the N producers is higher (lower) than θN , then
the profit is positive (negative). The value of the threshold of profitability22 (which is
21In 2010, the French energy regulator (CRE) estimated that a price between 37.5 and 38.8 euros per MWh
would permit the development of competition, at least in the market of professionals consumers, according to
the regulator, without penalizing EDF (Le Monde (01/02/2011)).
22In figure 7, the red crossed line represents the threshold of profitability of the thermal production.
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independent of the number of producers in the case of N identical producers) provided by
our numerical model is θ ∼= 18 GW (or equivalently 13 TWh per month) which exceeds
the level of the aggregate monthly thermal capacity Qthmax and thus, it leads always to
negative aggregate thermal profits (see Figure 4 on page 21). So, we conclude that
the quadratic form of the thermal production cost in combination with the pricing of
production at marginal cost (merit order price) causes important losses to the aggregate
producer in our model. This could be explained by the numerous approximations (in
particular the absence of mark-up rate) that we made within our model (see General
results on page 27, Subsection 4.3). The condition θ > Qthmax (observed numerically) is
not incompatible with positive profits. Indeed, the producer could manage to cover the
thermal production cost and even obtain a strictly positive profit if another generation
technology with higher marginal cost becomes the marginal technology (hydro technology
with storage, oil, etc.). In this case, the thermal production would be remunerated above
its own marginal cost which would help to recuperate its cost. However, the marginal
cost of the marginal technology (coming after thermal) needs to be non constant so that
the thermal production becomes profitable for the producer.
4.2 “Equivalence” of merit order equilibrium between an economy
with N producers and an economy with one aggregate producer
From a purely logical (mathematical) perspective, our numerical model is characterized by a
high level of complexity because of the high number of optimization variables and the impor-
tant amount of operational constraints even in the case of a unique producer (for N = 1, we
obtain 586 constraints in total). To reduce the number of optimization variables and opera-
tional constraints of our numerical model in order to facilitate the calculation of a merit order
equilibrium, we show through the following proposition that the merit order equilibrium in an
economy with N > 2 producers is “equivalent” to the merit order equilibrium in an economy
with one aggregate producer (N = 1). We use this mathematical proposition to calculate an
equilibrium of the original economy by working in an auxiliary economy with one aggregate
producer from now on. The aggregate producer holds the capacity of all the types of nuclear
units as well as the total thermal capacity. In particular, this will allow to simplify the no-
tations qnucnjt and q
th
nt by considering the notations q
nuc
jt and q
th
t that represent respectively the
level of the nuclear production during the month t for the unit j and the level of the thermal
production during the month t (and similarly for the stock).
Proposition 4.1 Let us consider an economy E with several producers and let E˜ be the aux-
iliary economy with a unique producer obtained by the aggregation of the N producers of E.
(α) If q is a merit order equilibrium of E˜ then it can be decentralized as a merit order equi-
librium (qn)
N
n=1 of E with regard to the same prices.
(β) Conversely, if (qn)
N
n=1 is a merit order equilibrium of E then its aggregation defined by
q =
∑N
n=1 qn is a merit order equilibrium of E˜ for the same prices.
Proof
A proof of this proposition is provided in our Ph.D. thesis on pages 131−136 (Lykidi (2014)).

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4.2.1 Economic implications of Proposition 4.1
In view of Proposition 4.1, we may say that the merit order equilibrium q of the centralized
economy E˜ (auxiliary economy) is “equivalent” to the merit order equilibrium (qn)
N
n=1 of the
decentralized economy E (original economy). This proposition permits to determine a merit
order equilibrium of the decentralized economy E by working in the economy E˜ with one
aggregate producer which holds the capacity of all the types of nuclear units and the total
thermal capacity and aims to satisfy the demand each month. From an economical point of
view, we deduce that at the optimum, the decentralized economy is not “superior” than the
economy with a unique producer (centralized economy), in terms of production, in the sense that
a merit order equilibrium of the decentralized economy constitutes a merit order equilibrium
of the economy with a unique producer and vice versa. Consequently, the decentralization of
the nuclear production segment is “neutral” in comparison with the centralized management
regarding the optimal production levels obtained in both organizational forms within our model.
4.3 Simulation results
In order to resolve the optimal short-term production problem numerically within our data set,
we deal with the problem of discontinuity of the merit order price which leads to the disconti-
nuity (decrease) of the current monthly profit. To do this, we resolve an approximate problem
(continuous problem) that is a “regularization” of our economical problem (discontinuous prob-
lem). The proof of several mathematical propositions appeared in this section can be found in
the Annex A of the Ph.D. thesis of Lykidi (2014).
4.3.1 “Regularization” of the optimal short-term production problem
The hypothesis of Proposition 3.2 that bnuc < bth holds within our data, thus the discontinuity
and more precisely the decrease of price at production vectors characterized by zero thermal
production during a month induces a discontinuity and specifically a decrease of the value of
profit during this month. A point that we need to stress is the nonexistence of an algorithm
that maximizes a discontinuous function. Theoretically and numerically, we proceed with a
“regularization” of the merit order price to treat the problem of discontinuity and resolve
the optimal short-production problem. Theoretically, we dealt with this problem through an
equivalent optimization problem being the optimal short-term production problem determined
on the subset H tth of the set of feasible solutions H
t (see Corollary 3.1 on page 17). We recall
that the set H tth is characterized by strictly positive thermal production levels and thus, the
marginal cost of thermal determines the price for all t. Within this set, the current monthly
profit is a continuous function. Numerically, we propose an alternative model, where the price
is given by the thermal marginal cost (mcth(0) = bth) instead of the nuclear marginal cost (bnuc)
when nuclear is the marginal technology. Thus, at the date t, the price pt will be
pt =
{
mcth(qtht ), if q
th
t > 0
mcth(0), if qtht = 0
=
{
bth + 2cthq
th
t , if q
th
t > 0
bth, if q
th
t = 0
(13)
This means that a producer receives at least bth (Euros per MWh) when it runs only its
nuclear units to cover the monthly demand. In view of this “regularization” of the merit order
price, the current monthly profit being now a continuous function is maximized on the entire
set of feasible solutions H t within our numerical model resulting in a continuous optimization
problem, the “regularized” problem. However, the “regularized” problem (continuous problem)
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and the economical problem (12) described in subsection 3.4 (discontinuous problem) differ with
respect to the objective function which is the profit. More precisely, the profit of the economical
problem is smaller than the profit of the “regularized” problem since the value of bnuc (5.01
Euro/MWh) is less important than the value of bth (26.24 Euro/MWh). Nevertheless, for all t,
we show that the value of the “regularized” problem and the value of the economical problem
are identical, meaning that the optimal value of the profit is the same for both optimization
problems (see Annex A, Proposition A.1). Consequently, the “regularized” problem is a “good”
approximation of our economical problem (Boyd and Vandenberghe (2004)).
From a theoretical perspective, in view of Proposition A.3 demonstrated in the Annex A,
for all t, if a solution of the “regularized” problem does not belong to the set H tth, then the set
of solutions of the economical problem is empty. Numerically, the solution of the “regularized”
problem whose results are analyzed in this section does not belong to the set H tth since there
are months during which the thermal production is zero. Therefore, the set of solutions of the
economical problem is empty, hence the interest of focusing on the numerical solution coming
from the “regularized” problem. This numerical solution constitutes only an “approximate”
solution of our economical problem.
4.3.2 General results
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Figure 5: Simulated hydro(run-of-river)/nuclear/thermal production (in MW)
Nuclear follows the seasonal variations of demand by decreasing during summer and increas-
ing during winter (see Figure23 5, Figure24 6). The monthly nuclear production almost never
23The average nuclear production in the month t given that some unit is inactive during this month (month
of reloading) is represented by the black crossed line. Its evolution is periodic and is determined by the red
line. For example, the average nuclear production in January is the average nuclear production of the months
t = 1, 13, 25.
24The maximum nuclear production during the month t (
∑J
j=1 Q
j,nuc
max (t)) given that some unit is inactive
during this month (month of reloading) is represented by the purple dotted line. This periodic quantity is
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Figure 6: Simulated nuclear production (in MW)
reaches its maximum value (see Figure 6).
Similarly, the thermal production adjusts to demand’s seasonal variations during the entire
obviously below the nominal capacity of the French nuclear set represented by the crossed purple line. The
minimum nuclear production during the month t given that some unit is inactive during this month (month of
reloading) is represented by the purple line of asterisks.
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Figure 7: Simulated thermal production (in MW)
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Figure 8: Simulated nuclear fuel stock (in MW)
time horizon T (see Figure 5, Figure 7). The monthly thermal production reaches its maximum
value25 at the beginning of period T when the nuclear production is significantly low and then
during the month of December of 2008 and of 2009 to meet the peek levels of demand (see
Figure 7). However, the thermal production becomes zero at the end of period T since the
nuclear production is very important and covers the monthly demand.
We also observe that the nuclear fuel stock decreases during periods of high demand while
increases during periods of low demand (see Figure 8). The trend of the stock appears funda-
mentally above the “stock of reference”26 during the time horizon T of the model.
We should note, before we procced with a more detailed analysis of our simulation results,
that the reader should not focus on the precise amount of profit since it depends on too many
of the approximations we did (euro/dollar, oil prices, CO2 cost, discount rate, no mark-up
rate, absence of profits coming from the run-of-river hydro technology, etc.) and because our
modelling does not consider the electricity importations/exportations or the production coming
from renewable and hydro storage plants (see Figure 9).
4.3.3 Analytical results
We shall separate period T into three sub-periods to give some structure to the following
discussion regarding the evolution of nuclear and thermal production, of stock, of price and
of profit. According to figure 5, we distinguish first a sub-period during which the nuclear
production is below its average value and the thermal is the marginal technology. A medium
sub-period with a nuclear production that oscillates around its average value and a basically
periodical evolution of the nuclear and thermal production. Finally, a third sub-period during
25The maximum thermal production during a month (Qthmax) is represented by the white blue dotted line and
corresponds to the nominal thermal capacity (including coal, gas, fuel, etc.) of the French set.
26The “stock of reference” is represented by the blue dotted line which shows the value of stock at the
beginning, being also the value of stock at the end.
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Figure 9: Simulated “regularized” price (in Euro/MWh)/Simulated “regularized” profit (ex-
cluding profit coming from hydro (run-of-river) generation) (in Euro (million))
which nuclear production is above its average value and it is mainly the marginal technology.
4.3.4 First sub-period (January 2007 - April 2007)
The nuclear production decreases from January to April due to the decrease of the demand
during this period. We also observe that the nuclear production is significantly low during the
first months of the simulation in comparison with the same months of the following years (see
Figure 5, Figure 6).
On the contrary, the thermal production increases significantly because of the important
levels of demand and the low levels of the nuclear production of this period (see Figure 5,
Figure 7). In particular, the thermal production reaches its maximum value during the period
January - March.
Paradoxically, the amounts of stock observed in this period are less important than those of
the corresponding period of the next years. It seems that the nuclear fuel stock is “overused”
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during the first sub-period and this results in quantities of stock significantly lower than the
“stock of reference” (see Figure 8). In particular, there is an impulsion to decrease the stock
from January to February which drives the trend of the nuclear fuel stock below its reference
value over the entire first sub-period. From February to April, the quantity of stock increases
progressively following the decrease of the demand and thus the decrease of the nuclear pro-
duction without however exceeding the “stock of reference”.
The price27 and the profit detected during the months of the first sub-period are higher than
the price and the profit perceived during the same months of the next years because of the
maximum levels of thermal production noticed in these months (see Figure 9). Consequently, if
the nuclear units underproduce then the thermal units need to overproduce to meet the levels
of demand of this period. Hence, significant gains28 are generated if we compare them with the
gains obtained during the same months of the years that follow.
4.3.5 Medium sub-period (May 2007 - May 2009)
The nuclear production follows the seasonal variations of demand which means high production
during winter and low production during summer (see Figure 6). This implies “low” levels of
nuclear fuel stock during winter and “high” levels of nuclear fuel stock during summer (see
Figure 8). Clearly, the essentially periodical evolution of the nuclear production implies a
periodical evolution for the nuclear fuel stock too. Note that the trend of the stock is above
the “stock of reference” suggesting that it is not “overconsumed”. However, during months of
high demand when the nuclear production is important, the stock decreases significantly and
reaches its “reference” value.
Similarly, the thermal production is high during winter (respectively low during summer)
because of the high (respectively low) demand. In particular, the thermal production is in-
creasing during winter (beginning from September) until it reaches its peak value November
and December. It becomes decreasing in summer without however reaching its minimum value
because of the very low levels of nuclear production (see Figure 7).
The price is high during months of high demand (winter) by taking its highest value through
the period November - December and relatively low during months of low demand (summer).
The profit is high during winter and at the beginning of spring while lower profits are realized
during summer. Moreover, we can see that its value can be decomposed in a cyclical component
and a linear trend which is slightly increasing.
4.3.6 Last sub-period (June 2009 - December 2009)
In figures 5 and 6, we observe that the nuclear production increases significantly during the
last sub-period, especially from September to December. Particularly, during the last two
months of this period (November, December), nuclear production approaches its maximum
level. Inevitably, the nuclear fuel stock decreases without however being lower than the “stock
of reference” (see Figure 8).
In view of the “overproduction” of the nuclear units, the demand is totally covered by
the nuclear production with only exception the month of November, December when demand
increases significantly and the participation of the thermal production is necessary. Therefore,
the thermal production is very low becoming zero during the majority of the months of the last
sub-period except of the period November - December (see Figure 5, Figure 7).
27The red dotted line indicates the “regularized” price level when nuclear is the marginal technology.
28Recall that the mark-up rate is taken equal to zero.
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Nuclear is mainly the marginal technology and determines the price at the last sub-period.
For this reason, we see that the price and the profit reach their lowest levels during this period.
This is noticed even at the end of the last sub-period since the low participation of the thermal
production leads to a low price and hence to a low profit in November, December (see Figure
9).
4.3.7 The duration of marginality of nuclear and thermal generation technology
We deduce that thermal is the marginal technology during most of the months of period T
while nuclear is marginal only at the end of period T. The thermal production is used almost
always to satisfy global demand and maximize the instantaneous monthly profit despite the
fact that the nuclear production is remunerated above its “real” marginal cost (bnuc) when it is
marginal due to the “regularization” of the merit order price. The valorization of the nuclear
production could imply a more important period of marginality for nuclear since producers
are no more penalized by low prices (e.g. run only the nuclear units during periods of low
demand). Nevertheless, this is not the case when the producers do not know how to manage
optimally the resevoir in a market-based electricity system and thus, they choose a short-term
horizon of operation which however makes them “short-sighted” with respect to future profits.
Therefore, the numerical results regarding the duration of marginality of nuclear provide only
an indication of this duration without certainty of how it will evolve in the case of a yearly
or multi-annual optimization. This constitutes a limit of the short-term profit maximization
problem.
4.3.8 General remarks
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
0
10000
20000
30000
40000
50000
60000
70000
80000
Time
hydraulic production
nuclear production
thermal production
Production
Time
Figure 10: Simulated hydro(run-of-river)/nuclear/thermal production (in MW) (T=72)
In view of Remark 3.2, we obtain unicity of solutions regarding the thermal component but
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considering the other variables which do not influence the current monthly profit the complete
solution is not automatically unique.
To end, if we modify the length of the time horizon of the model (i.e. T > 36 months),
the behaviour of the producer does not change. The evolution of the nuclear and thermal
production during the first and the last sub-period as well as the fundamentally periodical
evolution of the production during the medium sub-period are the same (e.g. for T = 72, see
Figure 10).
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we looked at the question of the optimal management of a flexible nuclear set
(like the French set) in a competitive electricity system on a short-term basis. Flexible nuclear
plants respond to variations in demand as a result of the design of modern nuclear reactors
and of the significant share of nuclear in the national energy mix of a country. The originality
of our research consists of the assumption that the nuclear fuel functions as a “reservoir” of
energy in the medium-term horizon. This key feature of nuclear fuel as a “reservoir” is based
on the periodical shutdown of nuclear reactors for fuel reloading. The consideration of the
periodical interruptions of production to reload nuclear reactors with fuel made immediately
our model complex. Their timing and frequency determined the modelling of the generating
units by specifying their essential inherent characteristics (available nuclear capacity, month of
reloading) that play a crucial role in the choice of the optimal production.
In view of the complexity of the nuclear generation technology and the introduction of com-
petition in a rather monopolistic electricity market, the simultaneous consideration of all these
components (abundance of nuclear, flexibility, competitiveness, nuclear fuel reservoir) within
our model is not straightforward on a technical, mathematical and economical level. Therefore,
an enormous work concerning the modelling of the parameters and the numerical calibration
of our model has been realized in this paper. A number of assumptions and simplifications
needed to be made in order to overcome the potential difficulties concerning the construction
of the model and the resolution of the optimization problems resulted in it. Obviously, these
assumptions limited our modelling to some extent, however they were necessary in order to
reach to the existence of solutions. The choice of reasoning in months29 rather than weeks
is a compromise between refinement of the model and computational capacity. The obtained
theoretical and numerical results are intrinsic to our model and any deviations from reality
are observed mainly because nuclear managers and in particular the French nuclear operator
(EDF) does not take into account our considerations. For example, as stated in the report of
CRE in 2007, nuclear has been the marginal technology during periods of low demand meaning
that thermal has not been the marginal technology over the entire year as it is suggested by the
numerical results of the optimal short-term production problem. Note that a finer management
horizon of the reservoir e.g. a week instead of a month could show periods during which nuclear
is the marginal technology. Economically, these results coming from the different approaches
proposed in our model and in which the system operator may be interested provide insights in
order to supply conclusions for policy and industry.
Three different approaches were distinguished in order to determine an equilibrium of the
optimal short-term production problem. In our first approach, we showed that there are theo-
retical and numerical difficulties of calculating an equilibrium by looking at the seasonal pattern
29We also find this reasoning in articles which study the optimal management of hydro-reservoirs in mixed
hydro-thermal electricity systems (e.g. Arellano (2004), Bushnell (1998)).
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of price as a result of the behaviour of supply vis-a`-vis the merit order price and of the inter-
temporel management of the nuclear fuel stock. We do not claim that this behaviour will
persist if we choose marginal cost functions different than those of our model. However, our
choice of marginal cost functions (nuclear and thermal) being a satisfactory approximation
of the marginal costs of generation technologies as they appear in the merit order could give
some insights with respect to the potential barriers of determining an equilibrium. Thus, we
considered the inter-temporal behaviour of demand in the computation of an equilibrium. In
our second approach, we observed (via a numerical simulation) that when the equality be-
tween supply and demand is taken into account only for the month t in the optimal short-term
production problem, there exists a month during which the production constraints and the
supply-demand equilibrium constraint can not be respected simultaneously. Therefore, a high
level of “short-sightedness” with respect to future demand is intolerable in a market where
nuclear has a dominant position and it leads to a failure to compute an equilibrium. This also
implies that any level of “short-sightedness” regarding nuclear capacity investments in future
months is not acceptable in order to avoid future disruptions on supply. For this reason, in
our last approach, the equality between supply and demand is sufficiently anticipated in future
months in order to manage the current use of the resevoir and an equilibrium is calculated
within a numerical model.
From a mathematical perspective, we showed that the discontinuity (decrease) of the merit
order price induced by the high marginal cost of thermal and the low marginal cost of nuclear
results in a discontinuity (decrease) of producer’s current monthly profit. The discontinuity of
the merit order price is well-known and does not result in an absence of equilibrium in the case
of a static model. Here, the dynamic character of our model resulting from the modelling of the
nuclear fuel stock as a reservoir brings up the difficulty of finding an equilibrium theoretically
and numerically in view of the discontinuity of the price and hence of the profit.
To treat the problem of discontinuity of the merit order price within our numerical model,
we “regularized” our economical problem (discontinuous problem) through the “regularization”
of the merit order price. We showed that this difficulty to find theoretically and numerically
an equilibrium has economic consequences since it leads to overpay electricity during months
of nuclear marginality. The “regularization” of the merit order price refers to an “opportunity”
cost which is added to the marginal cost of nuclear. The “opportunity” cost then represents a
compensation of producers for using only their nuclear capacities to meet demand instead of
calling thermal generation technologies (coal, gas). Therefore, they benefit from a higher market
price which helps to amortize their high fixed costs. This can be seen in the monitoring report
of the French energy regulator (CRE) in 2007 which validates the use of nuclear capacities given
that the use is based on a calculation of “opportunity” cost (which is not accessible/verifiable).
According to this report, on the day-ahead market, the price reflected the valorization, decided
by the historical operator (EDF), of nuclear production when nuclear is the marginal technology.
The level of this valorization is generally higher than the marginal cost of nuclear production.
Thus, a producer, even dominant, may legitimately seek the optimization of its income given
that it does not constitute an abuse of dominant position or price manipulation. Within
our numerical example, we concluded that the set of solutions of the economical problem
(discontinuous problem) is empty. Hence, we concentrated our analysis on the solution of an
approximate problem (continuous problem), the “regularized” problem, by proving that the
value of both optimization problems (the “regularized” problem and the economical problem)
is the same. This numerical solution is only an “approximate” solution of our economical
problem.
The “regularization” of the merit order price erased “irregularities” i.e. the discontinuity of
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the price and of the profit and led to a “regularized” optimal production problem, in which we
found an equilibrium. Thereby, we reached a satisfying situation which permits to obtain an
equilibrium. The fact that if an economic phenomenon is not “regular”, it is not intellectually
satisfying can be found for example in Balasko’s work regarding the theory of general equilib-
rium (Balasko (1988)). More precisely, Balasko mentions that, within a “regular” economy, we
can find several properties of an equilibrium (e.g. continuity, existence and stability of equi-
librium with respect to the parameters that define the economy) that we hope to verify in all
economies since they are desirable for an equilibrium (insofar as they are not verified, infinitely
more complex and also difficult to manage phenomena occur).
In view of the results coming from the resolution of the “regularized” problem (continuous
problem), the period during which nuclear is marginal is shorter than one could expect given
the “regularization” of the merit order price and the abundance of nuclear in the energy mix.
Basically, we observed that producers use thermal capacities to maximize their current monthly
profit and meet demand during almost the whole time horizon of the model. Hence, market
price is determined almost always, even during seasons of low demand (summer), by the thermal
marginal cost. The partial “short-sightedness” that characterizes producers with regard to
future profit optimization does not permit them to use capacities (nuclear and thermal) in a
more efficient way (e.g. using only nuclear capacities during summer).
To conclude, in this paper, we determined the optimal production behaviour by looking at
the short-term (monthly) horizon of operation of the nuclear fuel reservoir. This mode of op-
eration is not based on the direct optimization of the production over the entire period T . It
could, however, correspond to the prudent behaviour of a nuclear set quitting the monopoly era
and discovering step by step how flexible nuclear plants are operated in a competitive electricity
market. Practically, this work permitted to model the nuclear fuel reservoir in presence of fossil
fuel technologies (coal, gas) and then to identify and deal with a large number of mathemati-
cal, technical and computational difficulties regarding the modelling of the optimal production
problem and its theoretical and numerical resolution in order to find an equilibrium (e.g. num-
ber of optimization constraints, number of optimization variables, price discontinuity, data set,
computational algorithms, etc.). Despite this complex work, we verified the existence of an
optimal production trajectory and we calculated it. We also became aware of the consequences
of a partially “myopic” (short-sighted) approach regarding the optimal production behaviour
and hence the interest of proceeding with the “non-myopic” case. Consequently, we conclude
that this work is fundamental for the future analysis of the inter-temporal optimization as it
would result from the full optimization of production during the whole time horizon of the
model. No doubt that market based management of flexible nuclear plants would then like to
look at determining a global optimum of the optimal production problem. This further analysis
is studied in a companion paper.
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